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9. Remembering Stanley Cavell 
BYRON DAVIES 
This memorial notice for Stanley Cavell was first published on the Harvard Philosophy Department 
website on June 25, 2018 and appears here with the department’s permission. 
For over four decades one of the most distinctive and original contributors to Ameri-
can letters—and one of the world’s most significant proponents of what philosophy 
could learn from the arts—was a member of the community of Emerson Hall. But so 
long as Stanley Cavell is best known just as a philosopher who wrote about Shake-
speare and movies (as he was first introduced to me), and even if his unassailable in-
stitutional legacy is as the advisor of generations of accomplished philosophers (and 
film and literary scholars), the task for philosophers memorializing Cavell is to com-
municate what he taught us, and in particular what he taught us to do.  
We can begin by saying that Cavell was a reader of Wittgenstein. In particular, 
Cavell was a reader of the methods of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations as 
methods for understanding ourselves. This not only opened that text to readers for 
whom frustrated attempts to locate a body of doctrines had closed it off; it also ope-
ned up lines of communication between that text and older understandings of philo-
sophy as a method for arriving at self-consciousness (especially Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy) as well as the methods of self-avowal characteristic of psychoanalysis.  1
Given that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is often read as conservative or quietist, it 
is important to note that Cavell’s writing also located the emancipatory potential of 
Philosophical Investigations, particularly in Wittgenstein’s exhortation that we turn 
our inquiry around our “real need.”  In a conscious rebuke to misunderstandings of 2
" . Cavell, “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” in Must We Mean What We Say?: A 1
Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 64-67.
" . Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and 2
Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §108.
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what it meant to be an “ordinary language philosopher,” Cavell saw, in his reading of 
Wittgenstein, the ordinary as precisely the site for philosophical criticism: “Wittgens-
tein’s appeal or ‘approach’ to the everyday finds the (actual) everyday to be as perva-
sive a scene of illusion and trance and artificiality (of need) as Plato or Rousseau or 
Marx had found.”   3
One human need that Cavell articulated with particular poignancy was the 
need to speak for others (to constitute a community through one’s speech), as well as 
the correlative need to be spoken for by others (to find oneself in the community of 
another’s speech). In the first four essays of his first book, Must We Mean What We 
Say?, the significance of this need emerged through Cavell’s interrogating the practi-
ce of Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin of asserting “what we say,” apparently without em-
pirical linguistic evidence. What could entitle them to such assertions? What criteria 
could they be relying on? Particularly as these questions were developed in Part One 
of The Claim of Reason (1979), Cavell insisted that our understanding of them will be 
distorted so long as we think of the ground of intelligibility as always given, as oppo-
sed to always at stake in—and as constituted by—our aiming to be intelligible to 
others. That is, the charge for being intelligible to others lay in us, in our ability to 
project criteria into new contexts (often requiring creativity and improvisation), and 
it could not—as Cavell reminded us, against persistent philosophical fantasies—lie in 
criteria alone.  Consequently, whereas others would have understood the question of 4
what entitles us to assertions about “what we say” as a narrowly epistemological 
question, Cavell insisted that its full significance could not be understood without se-
eing its affinities with certain political questions—some of them familiar from Rous-
seau—including that of how to constitute a community when a pre-existing Social 
Contract is not assured, as well as when we suspect that “we are exercising our will 
not to the general but to the particular, to the partial, to the unequal, to private bene-
fit, to privacy.”   5
" . Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein (Chica3 -
go: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 46.
" . See Steven G. Affeldt, “The Ground of Mutuality: Criteria, Judgment and Intelligibility in Stephen 4
Mulhall and Stanley Cavell,” European Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 1 (2002): 1-31.
" . Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford 5
University Press, 1979), 26.
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Indeed, one of Cavell’s abiding concerns was to draw attention to the ways in 
which the formulation of a philosophical problem might distort the real need or inte-
rest motivating that problem in the first place. This is most evident in his writing on 
skepticism, and in his arguments that the problem of skepticism about other minds 
(“How can I really know you are in pain?”) is in fact a theoretical registration of our 
separateness from others—a feature of the human condition that cannot be “solved,” 
though nothing is more characteristic of humans than to deny it or try to overcome 
it.  Among those, in their jealousy and possessiveness, who have struggled with this 6
separateness are King Lear, King Leontes, and Othello, though it was in the book 
immediately following Cavell’s plaintive reading of Othello at the end of The Claim of 
Reason that he began to give us his positive vision, not of tragedy but of comedy, and 
of how we might create a community founded on our shared separateness. Thus, in 
Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (1981), Cavell ar-
gued, through readings of seven Hollywood romantic comedies, that, just as we can-
not depend simply on preexisting criteria in order to be intelligible to one another, 
“There is no place to go in order to acquire the authority of connection…You cannot 
wait for the perfected community to be presented.”  And yet, for the seven couples 7
examined in that book, sometimes despite themselves, a community happens.  
I did not get to see Stanley in the last year of his life. But in the nine years at 
the end of his life in which I did know him, I was inspired as he approached his aging 
with the happy spirit of an inveterate improvisor. He could always be relied on to ad 
lib. I remember in 2010—after a large standing-room-only occasion at Harvard cele-
brating the publication that year of his memoir Little Did I Know—the very last of us 
were filing out of the lecture hall: I turned around to find behind me the very man 
who had been fêted for the last two hours—only this time alone, human, and unguar-
ded. “Ha, I didn’t realize who was behind me!” I said to Stanley, to which he replied, 
“Don’t worry—we’re all behind you.”  
The fact that in the course of the deepest readings of some of our most public 
texts and films we can also find such authentically private assurances is surely a big 
" . Cavell, “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” in Must We Mean What We Say, 96.6
" . Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 7
University Press, 1981), 109.
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part of what will keep many of us permanently pinned to Stanley Cavell’s writing. In 
that way, his writing shows us how to go on.  8
" . I acknowledge the support of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)’s Postdoctor8 -
al Fellowship Program at the Institute for Philosophical Research, in which I am under the supervision 
of Carlos Pereda.
